5 Responses to “Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction”

1. Yong-shik Hwang Says:
   March 1st, 2010 at 8:25 am

   The book arrived on time in good condtion. I appreciate the quality of the book and speedy delivery. Tnanks.

   Rating: 5 / 5

2. Shalom Freedman Says:
   March 1st, 2010 at 10:40 am

   I do not have this book. I wish I did. I read the first six pages of the book which explains how various scientific disciplines have in the course of History broken off from Science, and come to constitute fields of learning of their own, and understood that this is a very clearly written and informative book. I am sure that it will lay out clearly the major questions raised today in the Philosophy of Science. As I understand it one major idea of the work is that there are philosophical questions that Science cannot answer . Or to put this in another way that Philosophy in a sense sets the limits of scientific inquiry.
   
   What strikes and troubles me in terms of the relationship of Philosophy and Science is that the latter produces in many cases testable conclusions, and thus has the authority of providing us ‘ truth’. And this when as far as I can tell or feel ‘ philosophical discourse ‘ is like discourse in the humanities, ‘ interpretative’. And it thus does not provide us with what is testable, objective, and ‘ communally held’. Of course I know that one of the questions of Philosophy of Science is whether there is such a ‘thing’ as ‘ objective truth’. But clearly in common sense terms, and in terms of the way most people think and act in the world of the mind ‘ scientific results’ do have a quality in truth, that ‘ philosophical arguments ‘ do not.
   
   I am curious as to how this volume deals with these questions.
   
   I apologize for taking the reader’s time. My sense is that this is a very good introduction to the whole subject.
   Rating: 5 / 5

3. R. Albin Says:
   March 1st, 2010 at 11:50 am

   This is a fine introduction to philosophy of science. Rosenberg discusses why philosophy of science is such an important part of philosophy and how philosophy is connected to a number of deep and traditional problems of philosophy, particularly epistemologic questions. Scientific explanation, the nature of scientific laws and concepts of causation, the nature and role of theories, some of the traditional models of scientific explanation and progress like the D-N model and Popper’s notion of falsification, challenges to traditional empiricism such as Kuhn’s model and Quine’s analysis of underdetermination are all covered very well. These are often difficult topics but Rosenberg is a good writer and the explanations are generally clear. Each chapter has a nice summary and guide to the literature. The prevailing impression left by the text is the inadequacy of contemporary philosophy of science to really understand science and explain its successes.
   Rating: 4 / 5

4. Yothgoboufnir Says:
   March 1st, 2010 at 1:50 pm

   This book emphasizes problems in the philosophy of science over answers. It is specifically and effectively written as an introduction for beginning students. Thus, it proceeds mainly by identifying philosophical problems, thinking through potential answers, and then identifying problems with those potential answers. To other reviewers, this approach seems to have given the impression of unnecessary or unexpected digression, although I did not find the approach burdensome.

   Introductory education is as much about exposure to a range of issues and practice with ways of thinking as it is about specifying facts; the book balances these needs well. It provides the main persons and terms of which a philosopher of science should be able to speak, but it does so in the context of critical consideration rather than simple cataloging.

   I have to admit that I was a little surprised by how good the review questions were at the end of the chapters in prompting me to digest and articulate the ideas in the book, without seeming tedious or heavyhanded. The questions further emphasize critical thinking, often by requesting the reader to adopt different perspectives in approaching an issue. Many of the questions also make space for the student to bring into the discussion additional ideas not found in the book.

   The book succeeds in its goal of being an introduction to the field, but as a result of its specialization the book is not well suited for two related tasks often (and not without reason) expected of introductory books. First, it is not a handy desk reference, because it is neither properly structured nor sufficiently comprehensive for a reader to turn to a page and find a straightforward summary of any topic. Second, the book will not provide sufficient reading material for a semester-long university course, although it will provide the backbone to a course.

   The book approaches philosophy of science with a rather philosophical emphasis. Although early in the book Rosenberg notes a clear sense in which science requires philosophy, he has not written a book of answers to the kind of philosophical issues that typically pop up in the work of a research scientist. Indeed he occasionally notes that major issues discussed in the book are (seen as) irrelevant within the practice of research scientists. This is most true of the topic he pursues at greatest length: Kuhn’s concept of scientific paradigms and the legacy of Kuhn’s insight. While it might actually be extremely useful for researchers to consider the role of “normal science” in determining their research, Kuhn’s legacy is mainly in the practically irrelevant idea that scientific research does not actually provide an increasingly close approximation of objective natural reality. This is a philosophically (and socio-historically) important issue, but scientists have no reason to attend to it (and every reason not to).

   Although I was amenable to this esoteric/non-applied philosophy approach, on a perhaps-related note I was disappointed by the relative paucity of concrete examples in a discussion of evidence/epistemology. The one topic I wish had been pursued more was the notion of observable vs. unobservable things in nature, as this distinction was used in a commonsense way without being defined or justified. Indeed, an argument of Locke’s mentioned in the book seems to invalidate this distinction, but this was not discussed.

   Ultimately I think any reader/reviewer will wish some topic had been explored farther, but as the identities of these issues seems to vary from person to person, I think this indicates success rather than deficiency. This book is an introduction to questions, not a compendium of answers. The book is concise, and as I mentioned above I think a course based around this book would have room for additional reading. Thus, students would be able to pursue interests sparked but left unfulfilled by the book, or instructors could fill in deficiencies they find in the book’s coverage. For similar reasons, this book is a good read for informal students or readers with specialized interests, who want to obtain a grounding in the philosophy of science without being inhibited with an overly comprehensive volume.

   .

   (This is a review of the first edition.)
   Rating: 4 / 5

5. Anonymous Says:
   March 1st, 2010 at 2:34 pm

   I used this book in an introduction to philosophy of science course I took, along with an anthology of papers. The papers were hard to understand without this book. They were filled with a lot of jargon, and labels for different theories. This book helped me understand the labels, but it also got behind them to what the real issues between competing philosophies of science are, and how their arguments worked. It was not easy going but the effort to follow Rosenberg’s presentation was worth it.
   Rating: 5 / 5

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